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ALGORITHMS IN BUSINESS, MERCHANTCONSUMER INTERACTIONS, & REGULATION
Tabrez Y. Ebrahim*
Abstract
The shift towards the use of algorithms in business has transformed
merchant-consumer interactions. Products and services are increasingly
tailoredfor consumers through algorithms that collect and analyze vast amounts
of data from interconnected devices, digital platforms, and social networks.
While traditionally merchants and marketeers have utilized market
segmentation, customer demographicprofiles, and statistical approaches, the
exponential increase in consumer data and computing power enables them to
develop and implement algorithmic techniques that change consumer markets
and society as a whole. Algorithms enable targeting of consumers more
effectively, in real-time, and with high predictive accuracy in pricing and
profilingstrategies. In so doing, algorithms raise new theoreticalconsiderations
on information asymmetry and power imbalances in merchant-consumer
interactionsand multiply existing biases and discriminationor create new ones
in society. Against this backdrop of the concentration of algorithmic decisionmaking in merchants, the traditionalunderstanding of consumer protection is
overdue for change, and normative debate about fairness, accountability, and
transparency and interpretive considerations for non-discrimination is
necessary. The theory that notice and choice in data protection laws and
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consumerprotectionlaws are sufficient in an algorithmic era is inadequate, and
countervailing consumer empowerment is necessary to balance the power
between merchants and consumers. While legislative activity and regulation
have conceivably increased consumer-empowerment, such measures may
provide a limited or unclearresponse in the face of the transformativenature of
algorithms. Instead,policy makers should consider responsiblealgorithmiccode
and other proposalsas potentially effective responses in the analysis of socioeconomic dimensions of algorithms in business.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Algorithms continue to proliferate in society.' There is a growing
awareness of potential complications of algorithms based on their ability to
provide significant improvements in accuracy, consistency, speed, and capacity

See generally THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ALGORITHMS (Woodrow Barfield
WOODROW BARFIELD & UGO PAGALLO, RESEARCH HANDBOOK

ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2020);

ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Edward Elgar 2018); THOMAS WISCHMEYER & TIMO
RADEMACHER,
REGULATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Cambridge Univ. Press 2020);

ALGORITHMS AND LAW (Martin Ebers & Susana Navas eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2020).
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above the human baseline.2 While scholars and policymakers have devoted
4
substantial attention to algorithms and their impact on civil rights, 3 criminal law,
9
cybersecurity,5 discrimination, 6 due process,7 medicine,' and privacy, their
impact on consumers has languished in the periphery. Recent developments at
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") have revealed algorithmic decision10
The
making in business is increasingly used in the modern economy.
recognition of algorithmic decision-making among legislators in Europe with the
enactment of the General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR") suggests that
the use of algorithms will become increasingly common in society and of
concern to lawmakers and regulators."
But beyond these legitimate concerns for society, algorithms present
new considerations and unforeseen consequences for businesses and commercial
exchanges. Businesses use algorithms primarily for predictive analytics and the
optimization of business processes in new ways beyond our human capabilities

2

Christopher S. Yoo & Alicia Lai, Regulation of Algorithmic Tools in the United States 21

Public Law and Legal Theory (J. of L. & Econ. Regul., Research Paper No. 21-04, 2020).
See Solon Barocas
3
671, 677-712 (2016).

See Elizabeth E. Joh, Feeding the Machine: Policing, Crime Data, & Algorithms, 26 WM

&

4

& Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's DisparateImpact, 104 CALIF. L. REv.

MARY BILL RTS. J. 287 (2017).

See Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, ArtificialIntelligencein Cyber Peace, in CYBER PEACE (Cambridge
5
Univ. Press 2021).
6
See Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REv. 1023 (2017).
?
See AI Now INST., Litigating Algorithms Challenging Government Use of Algorithmic
Decision Systems (Sept. 2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms.pdf; John Villasenor
& Virginia Foggo, Algorithms and Sentencing: What Does Due Process Require?, BROOKINGS
INST. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/03/21/algorithms-andsentencing-what-does-due-process-require/.
a
See W. Nicholson Price 11, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REv. 421 (2017).
See Tim Simonite, When It Comes to Gorillas, Google Photos Remains Blind, WIRED (Jan.
9
11, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/when-it-comes-to-gorillas-google-photos-remains-blind/.

10

FED. TRADE COMM'N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?

1 (Jan. 2016),

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusionunderstanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf (suggesting that while companies historically have
collected and used customer information, the expanded use algorithms in online commerce and

digital applications, such as by shopping, website usage, bills payments, social media, fitness
trackers, and smart televisions, has greatly increased the amount of consumer data that is collected
to analyze consumer choices, experiences, and individual characteristics).
II
Byrce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on Algorithmic DecisionMaking anda "Right To Explanation", (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.08813.pdf, Guy Aridor,
Yeon-Koo Che & Tobias Salz, The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical
Evidence
from
GDPR,
FED.
TRADE
COMM'N
1-4
(June
9,
2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/publicevents/1548288/privacycon-2020guyaridor.pdf.
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and, in so doing, are magnifying power relations between merchants and
consumers.' 2
Scholars and commentators have debated power relations in the
information age by arguing that power imbalances can be prevented via an
information fiduciary-a particular type of merchant in the form of a digital
platform that collects data about users through digital means in ways that may be
shared with third parties or be used in ways that threaten the users' best
interests.' 3 The underluing principle in the information fiduciary literature is that
digital platforms can and should do more, and similarly, I assess what is being
done by algorithms where that duty may no longer work. My core premise is that
that there is more that can and should be done to protect consumers in response
to algorithms in the information age. In this Article, I critically analyze a concept
that is different yet related to an information fiduciary in the following manner:
(1) rather than an information fiduciary as a digital platform that has a
responsibility with respect to utilizing data about users and potentially sharing

12
See generally John Danaher, Michael J. Hogan, Chris Noone, R6nin Kennedy et al.,
Algorithmic Governance: Developing a Research Agenda Through the Power of Collective
Intelligence,
BIG
DATA
&
SOC'Y
(2017),

https://joumals.sagepub.com/doi/ful/1 0.1177/2053951717726554.
13

See generally Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciariesand the FirstAmendment, 49 U.C.

DAvis L. REv. 1183, 1186 (2016) (introducing the concept of an information fiduciary as a category
of people and businesses in the digital age to "argue that many online service providers and cloud
companies who collect, analyze, use, sell, and distribute personal information should be seen as
information fiduciaries towards their customers and end-users" and that "information fiduciaries
have special duties to act in ways that do not harm the interests of the people whose information
they collect, analyze, use, sell and distribute"); Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S.
Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries,42 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1057, 1062, 1087-

88, 1112-13 (2019) (applying fiduciary duties to data collectors in hopes of raising the bar of how
digital companies are expected their users' information); Ariel Dobkin, InformationFiduciariesin
Practice:DataPrivacyand User Expectations,33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 3-5,7 (2018) (analyzing
situations where merchants took financial advantage of consumers' personal information given by
consumers in a trust relationship to merchants, and arguing that merchants cross the line and
"breach the fiduciary duty when they abuse users' trust by: (1) using their data to manipulate them;
(2) using their data to discriminate against them; (3) sharing their data with third parties without

consent; or (4) violating their own privacy policies"); Linda M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A
Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REv. 497 (2019) (arguing that any
business model that relies on behavioral advertising is antithetical with a requirement that the
fiduciary place the client's interest above that of the fiduciary); Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and

Privacy, ICIS 1993 PROC. 65, 70-71 (1993) (coining the phrase "information fiduciary" by
suggesting that "information fiduciaries would naturally arise [and] would accept deposits of
information from depositors and seek to maximize the return on sales of that information in
national markets or elsewhere in return for a fee, some percentage of the total returns"); Jack Balkin
& Jonathan Zittrain, A GrandBargain To Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3,

2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/
(introducing the concept of an information fiduciary, or a person or business that deals with
information, and has "the duty to use personal data in ways that don't betray end users and harm

them" as a way to protect individual privacy rights).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol123/iss3/7
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that data with third parties, by contrast, I focus on a merchant and its digital
interaction with consumers through algorithms, and (2) similar to the notion of
an information fiduciary' as a response to a data collector's ability to sway a
user's (in particular a consumer's) actions for commercial gain (in particular for
the benefit of a merchant), I analzye potential manipulation by algorithms. In so
doing, I argue for legislation concerning algorithms and responsible algorithm
development to protect consumers. As such, the lens I employ is the
technological capability of algorithms in the relationship between merchants and
consumers in the modern digital context and how the law should respond
accordingly. The techniques embodied within algorithms present a capability and
means to create and multiply power imbalances in the merchant-consumer
interaction.
Scholars and policy analysts have voiced that algorithms, which are
forms of artificial intelligence and machine learning, are pervading society in
new ways with both beneficial and detrimental outcomes. 14 Noteworthy news
headlines claim numerous concerns about algorithms in criminal sentencing,"
dermatology, 16 and government decision-making." Some of the similar
challenges with algorithms from other disciplines are plaguing business.
Specifically, in exploring business issues with algorithms, a massive problem in
and of itself, relates to effects and interactions of merchants with consumers.
Consumers are finding themselves in an unbalanced interaction with
merchants in an algorithmic era. Algorithms have provided merchants a
technological means with which to exploit the wealth of consumer data so as to

14
10

Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Algorithms and Economic Justice, U.S.
(Jan.
24,

22020),

FED. TRADE COMM'N

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/publicstatements/ 1564883/remarks_of_commission

er_rebecca_kellyslaughteronalgorithmic_and_economicjustice_01-24-2020.pdf

(discussing

the transformative power of algorithms and how best to use their power to promote justice and
expand opportunity, while recognizing that algorithms have flaws and can create perils for society
with civil, criminal, and economic justice).
See Leah Wisser, Pandora'sAlgorithmic Black Box: The Challenges of Using Algorithmic
s5
Risk Assessments in Sentencing, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1811 (2019); Danielle Kehl, Priscilla Guo
& Samuel Kessler, Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Assessing the Use of Risk

Assessments

in Sentencing, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITIES INITIATIVE BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR

https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33746041/2017(2017),
SOc'Y
INTERNET
07_responsivecommunities_2.pd?; Al and Human Rights: CriminalJustice System: The Tools,
ELECTRONIC PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/ai/critninal-justice/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2021).
16
See Michael Allen, Al Dermatology Tool Needs More Diverse Skin Types in Its Training
Datasets, PHYSICS WORLD (Nov. 19, 2019), https://physicsworld.com/a/ai-dermatology-toolneeds-more-diverse-skin-types-in-its-training-datasets/.
See Robert Brauneis & Ellen Goodman, Algorithmic Transparencyfor the Smart City, 20
17
YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 107-08, 110, 132 (2018) (suggesting that a lack of transparency of
government and cities use of algorithms denies public access, when referring to transparency as

"the use of algorithms that are highly dynamic or that use modeling which makes them difficult to
interpret even when records are revealed").
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better target consumers. 18 In particular, algorithms enable merchants to decipher
accurately, easily, quickly, and in real-time inferences between consumer data
and possible responses for advertisements or offers for their products and
services.19 The plethora of consumer data, including their purchasing behaviors,
social media usage, and websites visited, allows merchants to utilize algorithms
to predictively trigger consumer reactions and drive purchasing decisions
through personalized, tailored ads and to discriminate among consumers
(whether intentionally or unintentionally). 20 This algorithmic ability has
transformed the merchant-consumer relationship and could further morph into
manipulation by merchants if left unaddressed by law and policy. While
algorithms may provide merchants with mechanisms to advance existing and
permissible ways to understand their customers and potential new consumers of
their products and services, they may also enable exercise of excessive control,
unexpected discrimination, and hidden intentional discrimination.
Algorithms provide a means to influence and modify consumer
behaviors. Consumers have become empowered by the Internet to access a global
marketplace and digital assistants that encompass algorithms.2 1 The massive
collection of consumer data and the emergence of algorithms as a new sociotechnical capability by merchants has shifted the merchant--consumer interaction
towards greater power with the merchant. As the Cambridge Analytica scandal
exemplified, data collected about individuals, such as from social networks, can
be utilized to understand people and consequently target them in ways meant to

18

I define "merchants" throughout this Article as entities to sell or offer to sell products and

services to consumers. In this context, a "merchant" is a producer or retailer that sell goods or

service through the Internet or digital app to a purchaser. While such "merchants" can be digital
businesses or online platforms that collect data about their users (such as in the information
fiduciary scholarship), they represent any digital business that sells to consumers; hence a merchant
in the context of this Article is broader in scope than an information fiduciary. Furthermore,
"merchant" is used to distinguish from other businesses that may be intermediaries or distributors
but may also be businesses or companies that function as producers and retailers. Merchants refers
to businesses that sell directly to a consumer, such as in a B2C (business-to-consumer) relationship.
19
Jakob Schemmel, ArtificialIntelligence and the FinancialMarkets: Business as Usual?, in
REGULATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 256 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2020) (describing the
proliferation of algorithmic tools in the business-customer relation).
20
FederalTrade Commission Announces Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection
in the 21st Century,' FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/hearings-

competition-consumer-protection-21st-century/hearings-announcement_0_0.pdf (last visited Feb.
18, 2021).
21
Michal S. Gal, Algorithmic Challenges to Autonomous Choice, 25 MICH. TECH.
L. REv. 59,
60, 64 (2018); Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
309, 311 (2017); Michael Weber, Marek Kowalkiewicz, J6rg Weking, Markus B6hm et al., When
Algorithms Go Shopping: Analyzing Business Models for Highly Autonomous Consumer Buying

Agents, 15TH INT'L CONF. ON WIRTSCHAFTSNFORMATIK (2020), https://library.gito.de/openaccess-pdf/J 12_Weber-WhenAlgorithms_Go_Shopping-336_c.pdf.
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change their behaviors. 22 Similarly algorithmic processing of consumer data for
the purpose of tailored pricing and personalized profiling can draw inferences
about consumers and adopt consequential actions, such as whether or not to send
an ad or what type of pricing to offer to the consumer. While personalized pricing
by itself is permissible by the law, algorithms present capabilities that should
raise concerns for the potential for unfair or deceptive practices. The potential of
algorithms to promote deceptive behaviors and related data privacy concerns
present consumer protection issues, for which there should be response by law
and policy.
Merchants' use of vast and increasing data sets, the rapid rise in
computing power, and continually increasing interconnected devices may also
enable categorization or grouping of certain classes of consumers in ways
(whether inadvertent or intentional) that could be considered a violation of antidiscrimination laws. As the FTC has recognized, "the collection and use of
personal data [via algorithms] raise consumer harm [if] a company collecting
personal data that helps inform a personalized pricing algorithm violate[s]
material promises related to the collection and use of those data[,] [and when it
is] based on factors like race, religion, gender, or national origin, it could violate
certain U.S. antidiscrimination laws." 23 While intentional discrimination may be
rare and difficult to identify due to the discrete nature of algorithmic processing
of data, algorithmic decision-making may present apparent disadvantages or
inadvertent offerings to certain groups of consumers. Algorithms may
systematically exclude certain categories of consumers based on assessments of
consumer data, which may reflect existing structural and systemic biases in
society.24 Furthermore, the technological characteristics of algorithms may
present unexpected discrimination or may multiply discrimination through the
mathematics of training data and utilizing neural networks or deep learning
techniques.2 5
An adequate legal and regulatory framework is necessary to direct
algorithms to address imbalances in merchant-consumer interactions. These
forms of legal protections are not concerned with the protection of data in and of

&

22
Ido Kilovaty, Data Breach Through Social Engineering, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 21,
2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/data-breach-through-social-engineering/; Tami Kim
Gerry Yemen, Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, and the (Uncertain) Future of Online Privacy,
13,
2020),
PUBL'G
(Sept.
BUs.
DARDEN

https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3660467.
23

Directoratefor Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Personalised

Pricing in the Digital Era-Note by the United States, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV.
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2018)140/en/pdf (quoting the
Federal Trade Commission).
24

Pauline T. Kim & Erika Hanson, PeopleAnalytics andthe Regulation ofInformation Under

the FairCredit ReportingAct, 61 ST. Louis U. L.J. 17, 19 (2016).
25
Igancio N. Cofone, Algorithmic DiscriminationIs an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS
L.J. 1389, 1394-96 (2019).
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itself, but with the protection of individuals through data and algorithms where
data is applied and used for predictions. 2 6 Indeed, algorithms are already
employed in business domains that are characterized by information asymmetry
and power imbalances, as well as biases and discrimination. As merchants keep
algorithms proprietary and in their control, the concentration of forecasting and
predictive capabilities away from public authorities will enable an ability to
influence and manipulate consumers, thereby increasing the power imbalance in
the merchant-consumer interaction if left unaddressed. Effective countervailing
powers need to be supported by legislation. Consumer protection and data
protection laws are inadequate in an algorithmic era. 27 While the European
Union's GDPR has provided some response in helping consumers attain greater
fairness, accountability, and transparency of algorithms, U.S. legislation has
been slow to respond to the algorithm-powered merchant. While consumerempowering algorithmic tools, business ethics considerations, and selfregulation by merchants are positive first steps, greater legal and regulatory
safeguards should also be taken into consideration. This Article's central insight
is that greater discussion and policymaking are necessary for both the safeguards
against the biases of the merchants who build and deploy algorithms and the
regulation of algorithms. This combination will play a key role in ensuring that
algorithms are being built in a way that promotes balanced merchant-consumer
interactions. This Article concludes that responsible algorithm code development
and policing through private panels of experts represents one option that would
supplement or complement existing regulation and legislative activity
concerning algorithms.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Following Part I's Introduction, Part
II describes the phenomenon of algorithmic decision-making in business,
provides representative applications and examples, explains the characteristics
and function of algorithms, and discusses pricing and profiling with the use of
algorithms. Part III explains the theoretical principles related to information
asymmetry and biases and discrimination and builds on these principles to
suggest the need for a regulatory response to algorithmic decision-making in the
consumer-merchant context. Part IV explains the state of regulation and reform
in the United States and Europe and closes with a proposal and future areas of
exploration. Part V concludes by recommending responsible algorithm code
development by a panel of experts one possible responsive measure.

26
Thomas Streinz, The Evolution of European Data Law, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 3
(Oxford University Press 3d ed.) (forthcoming 2021).
27
See SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. Ass'NS, Response to the Federal Trade Commission's
Request for Comments on Questions in Connection with Its February2019 Privacy Hearing 3-4
(Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public comments/2018/12/ftc-

2018-0098-d-0017-163225.pdf.
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II. PROLIFERATION OF ALGORITHMS IN BUSINESS
The rise of algorithms in business will require merchants and their
counsel to confront decades old processes and procedures and compare them to
analytical techniques to ascertain potential concerns. As algorithms grow in
popularity, policymakers need to develop policies and regulations that address
weakened consumer protection as a result of algorithms in the merchantconsumer context.

A.

Origins of Algorithms in Digital Commerce

Merchants have long utilized statistical methods to understand and
market to consumers. In the beginning of the digital revolution, algorithms
played an increasingly important role for merchants, but were based on limited
sample data sets. 28 The exponential increase in computing power, interconnected
devices, and platforms and social media usage have generated a concomitant
growth in consumer data. 29 In response, merchants have developed and deployed
30
algorithms to tailor consumer engagement and offerings.
While consumers are also able to utilize algorithms in ways that ease
their purchase process and use of a product or service, merchants are able to
clandestinely use algorithms to gain from a vast amount of consumer data and
transform the merchant-consumer interaction in profound ways. Consumers' use
of algorithms may make identification and convenience of products easier, such
as through digital assistants. 3' But a larger problem is that algorithms used by
merchants allow for control and influence of consumers' purchase decisions and
their use of products and services. Representative applications and examples and
a technological understanding of algorithms help to demonstrate consumers may
lack the necessary digital literacy in an algorithmic area, and merchants' use of
algorithms may impede consumers from making informed decisions.
1.

Applications & Examples

Merchants are increasingly utilizing algorithms to observe behaviors of
consumers and to address certain groups of consumers over time to develop a

Bernard Marr, A Short Historyof MachineLearning-EveryManagerShould Read, FORBES
28
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/02/19/a-short-history-of2016),
19,
(Feb.
machine-learning-every-manager-should-read/?sh=3a6fbad815 e7.
29
See generally Terrell McSweeny, ConsumerProtection in the Age of Connected Everything,
62 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 203 (2018).

30
See generally Zeshan Fayyaz, Mahsa Ebrahimian, Dina Nawara, Ahmed Ibrahim et al.,
Recommendation Systems: Algorithms, Challenges, Metrics, and Business Opportunities, 10
APPLIED Sci. 7748 (2020).
Benedict G. C. Dellaert, Suzanne B. Shu, Theo Arentze, Tom Baker et al., Consumer
3
Decisions with Artificially Intelligent Voice Assistants, 31 MKTG. LETTERS 335, 339-42 (2020).
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profile and to provide tailored solutions to those consumers. While there are
limited examples of direct litigation concerning the use of algorithms in the
merchant-consumer interaction, researchers and marketeers have designed and
utilized algorithms in behavioral or intelligent content marketing in a variety of
scenarios, which could expand and multiply with new use cases.
State of the art marketing techniques include the use of algorithms for
personalized marketing strategies to give merchants a more informed view of
consumer responses and to provide targeted responses and promotions. 32 The
same algorithmic techniques are utilized in a variety of merchant-consumer
interactions via digital assistants, online environments, and social media.
Examples of the use of algorithms by merchants for advertising and marketing
purposes that are prevalent in modern social media usage include (1) adaptive
scenarios with digital content, where media (i.e. video, sound, and animation) or
texts are utilized to receive feedback (i.e. like or dislike) from consumers to
determine which scenario to be provided to the consumer; (2) optimization
scenarios whereby a key value (i.e. total views of the scenario) and an additional
variable (i.e. total number of target consumers) in combination are utilized to
provide a scenario to a consumer; (3) intelligent evaluation of social media,
whereby consumer interaction with a webpage or ads is continually fed back to
the consumer; and (4) self-learning digital content that continually improves
itself based on feedback from consumers to suggest what may be increasingly
popular in a web environment. 33 Such algorithm powered approaches enable
merchants to interact with customers by providing vital insights, making
informed decisions, performing analytic calculations, and making automated
recommendations and, in so doing, allow merchants to optimize when and how
to respond to consumers. 34 Projections suggest that algorithm usage and new use
cases in the merchant-consumer context will experience exponential growth and
become a more significant issue in the regulatory context and in litigation. 5
2.

Understanding Algorithms

Consumer information is created and transmitted in digital data, which
is processed by merchants through algorithms in ways that analyze and monetize

32
Dan Dumitriu & Mirona Ana-Maria Popescu, Artificial Intelligence Solutions for Digital
Marketing, 46 PROCEDIA MFG. 630, 632 (2020).
33
Utku Kose & Selcuk Sert, Intelligent Content Marketing with Artificial Intelligence, INT'L
CONF.
OF
Sci.
CooP.
FOR
FUTURE,
Sept.
2016,
at
837-41,

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308520444_Intelligent_ContentMarketingwith_Artif

icialIntelligence.
34
Emmanouli Perakakis, George Mastorakis & Ionnia Kopanakis, Social Media Monitoring:
An Innovative IntelligentApproach, DESIGNS, May 20, 2019.
3
Robin Nunn, Discriminationin the Age of Algorithms, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF ALGORITHMS 182, 185, 187 (Woodrow Barfield ed. 2021).
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it to provide useful insights. Algorithms are the technological mechanisms that
provide a nexus between data and consumers. 36 Algorithms can be understood
via their technological characteristics and the lens of social power dynamics. The
technological and social aspects of algorithms are intertwined, and their
functionality can influence the deployment of power in social and economic
relationships.
Algorithms are a set of instructions to solve a problem or complete a
task. It can be a series of rules and formulas that are performed in a certain order
in software code. Algorithms can range from simple instructions to perform
repetitive tasks more efficiently than humans to more complex codes that analyze
large data sets, solve complex problems, and make predictions. Different types
of algorithms can be utilized by merchants in consumer outreach and interaction,
with more advanced ones employing artificial neural networks and deep learning
technologies.37 Merchants benefit from algorithms that provide ways to search,
aggregate, and cross reference large data sets to analyze different aspects of data,
identify patterns in unobservable cases of interest, and make predictions. 38
Algorithms can sift and search through data, generalize from examples, or can
be applied to problems with answers that require subjective interpretation or
explanations. 39 Data analysis through algorithms can help to predict future
behavior as if looking into a crystal ball.40
While algorithms refer to analytical methods and mathematical
techniques, other commonly used terms are related to, but distinguished from,
such techniques. "Big data" refers to the large quantities of data that are collected
and shared through increasingly connected devices. Algorithms utilize big data
and rely on artificial intelligence ("Al") and machine learning systems to extract
value from them. 4 1Artificial intelligence refers to a branch of computer science

36
Bjorn Steinr6tter, The (Envisaged)Legal FrameworkforCommercialisationofDigitalData
within the EU, in ALGORITHMS AND LAW 269-70 (Martin Ebers & Susana Navas eds., 2020).
3
Joseph Lemley, Shabab Bazrafkan & Peter Corcoran, Deep Learningfor ConsumerDevices
and Services: Pushing the Limits for Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence, and Computer
Vision, IEEE CONSUMER ELEC. MAG., Apr. 2017, at 48.
38
See Matt Taddy, The Technological Elements ofArtificial Intelligence, in THE ECONOMICS
OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 61 (Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans & Avi Goldfarb eds., 2019)
(explaining that Al automates tasks previously done by humans and requires a massive amount of
data and continued data generation to detect patterns and make predictions).

Gabriel Nicholas, ExplainingAlgorithmicDecision, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REv. 711, 714 (2010).
Mario Martini, Regulating Algorithms: How To Demystify the Alchemy of Code?, in
ALGORITHMS AND LAW 100 (Martin Ebers & Susana Navas eds., 2020).
41
Clark D. Asay, Artificial Stupidity, 61 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1187, 1190 (2020) (defining
39
40

Al as computing systems that perform tasks that normally would require human intelligence);
Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1305, 1307
(2019) (describing AI as using technology to automate tasks that normally require human

intelligence).
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that involves the design of intelligent systems to perform complex tasks.42
Machine learning is a subfield of Al that utilizes algorithms to learn iteratively
from data, and deep learning is a subfield of machine learning that attempts to
replicate activity of the human brain with artificial neural networks. 43 Algorithms
in the machine learning context involve mathematical techniques that recognize
patterns in large datasets and make predictions." Such machine learning
algorithms build a model from training data, which are effectively historical
examples, to train the model to behave in a certain way.4 5
With advancements in computing power, increasingly connected
devices, and a plethora of data via digital platforms and social media, algorithms
are being introduced by merchants to assist in or take the responsibility of
decisions affecting interactions with consumers. 46 The use of algorithms in
business can have real life consequences for the merchant-consumer interaction
based on the algorithm's technological characteristics. Algorithms may not be
transparent as to their inner working and their use and may cause consumers to

42

John Frank Weaver, Regulation of Artificial Intelligence in the United States, in RESEARCH

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

155, 156-57 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo

Pagallo eds., 2018).

43

See Joost N. Kok, Egbert J. W. Boers, Walter A. Kosters & Peter van der Putten, Artificial

Intelligence: Definitions, Trends, Techniques, and Cases, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1, 1-2
(2009). The following definition of Al is based on The New International Webster's
Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language, Encyclopedic Edition: "An area of study in
the field of computer science. Artificial intelligence is concerned with the development of
computers able to engage in human-like thought processes such as learning, reasoning, and selfcorrection." SMITH S. STEPHENSON, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL WEBSTER'S COMPREHENSIVE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, ENCYCLOPEDIC EDITION (2004).

Artificial intelligence can also be defined as:
The concept that machines can be improved to assume some capabilities
normally thought to be like human intelligence such as learning, adapting, selfcorrection, etc. The extension of human intelligence through the use of
computers, as in times past physical power was extended through the use of
mechanical tools. In a restricted sense, the study of techniques to use

computers more effectively by improved programming techniques.
Kok, supra, at 2.
44
See Angela Daly, Thila Hagendorff, Li Hui, Monique Mann et al., Artificial Intelligence
Governanceand Ethics: GlobalPerspectives 5 (Univ. of Hong Kong Faculty of L. Research Paper

No. 2019/033, June 28, 2019) (describing Al as detecting patterns in data and making predictions
on the basis of such datasets, which requires identification of correlations within the datasets).
45

See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, TransparencyandAlgorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN.

L. REv. 1, 14-15 (2019).
46
Agnieszka Jablonowska, Maciej Kuziemski, Anna Maria Nowak, Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz
et al., Consumer Law and ArtificialIntelligence Challenges to the EU Consumer Law andPolicy
Stemming from the Business' Use of Artificial Intelligence 19 (Eur. Univ. Inst. L. Working Paper

No. 2018/11, 2018).
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become accustomed to less interaction with humans. 47 The lack of transparency
as to whether an algorithm was applied and the lack of public scrutiny over their
application gives rise to consumers being highly vulnerable to manipulation by
merchants in specific purchase choices. The more dependent a consumer is on
algorithms, the less informed the consumer will become in making choices
related to products and services. As a result of these technological characteristics,
consumers may lack the digital literacy to interact with algorithms and may be
unable to make informed purchase decisions. 48
One key aspect in understanding algorithms from the legal, normative,
and policy perspective is that algorithms are representations of social processes
49
and that the social world is imbedded in their substrates of code. Algorithms
embody value-laden judgments that represent perceptions, understandings, and
0
reasoning and underlying assumptions beyond simply solving particular tasks.
Due to challenges with accessing how algorithms work and the lack of resources
and expertise to adequately assess them, algorithms can create power
imbalances.'" Given that the code of algorithms is rarely available, and in cases
where it is available, it is difficult to understand and scrutinize, algorithms can
52
become indirect control mechanisms that compound power imbalances.
Algorithms impact human behaviors since their ability to provide automation and
analytics can drive modifications to human behaviors, monopolies, and power
implications in society.53

47

See Valerie Beaudouin, Isabell Bloch, David Bouni, Stephan Clemengon et al., Flexible and

Context-Specific Al Explainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach 7-9, 12-13 (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.07703.pdf '(suggesting that the functioning of an algorithm is not
transparent, which in turns provides a lack of traceability, auditability, and accountability to the
algorithmic system).
See generally Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
48
Development [OECD], Toolkit for Protecting Digital Consumers, A Resource for G20 Policy
http://www.oecd.org/digital/consumer/toolkit-for-protecting-digital(2018),
Makers
consumers.pdf.
David Beer, The Social Power of Algorithms, Information, Communication, & Society, 20
49

INFO. COMMC'N SOc'Y 1, 4 (2017) (suggesting that algorithms are modelled on versions of the
social world and are reflective of underlying social processes).
s
Gregory Weheeler, Machine Epistemology andBig Data, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (Lee McIntyre & Alex Rosenberg eds., 2016).

&

Alexandra Mateescu & Aiha Nguyen, Algorithmic Management in the Workplace, DATA
51
SOC'Y, Feb. 2019, at 1.
52
Tom Barratt, Alex Veen & Caleb Goods, Algorithms Are Entrenching a Power Imbalance
Between
Employer
and
Employee,
SMARTCOMPANY
(Aug.
26,
https://www.smartcompany.com.au/technology/algorithms-power-imbalance-employeremployee/.
5

2020),

S.C. Olhede & P.J. Wolfe, The Growing Ubiquity of Algorithms in Society: Implications,
ROYAL SOC'Y, Aug. 6, 2018, at 8.

Impacts, andInnovations, PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
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Response to Potential Critique

This proposal to address power imbalances in the merchant-consumer
interaction created by the proliferation of algorithms must address some
criticisms. The threat of losing innovative advertising capabilities may motivate
merchants to respond to legislation and regulation of algorithmic decisionmaking with arguments supporting prioritization of commerce.
The most obvious objection is that algorithms do not transform the
merchant-consumer interaction since they are an incremental technological
improvement to existing capabilities. While it is certainly true that merchants
have long observed the behaviors of consumers and responded to consumers'
purchasing patterns to develop customized offerings, algorithms increase
understanding of consumers at a signifciant scale and in an opaque manner. The
argument that algorithms are an incremental innovation has been proposed since
they do not allow yet for omniscience or general intelligence.54 While such a
critique is not without merit, it fails to consider that algorithmic decision-making
may be best understood as presenting a new, powerful capability available to
merchants that have greater resources than consumers. Society should consider
the opaqueness of algorithms when assessing the modern merchant-consumer
interaction.
Along these lines, merchants may object that they should have the right
to analyze consumers as they choose. As a general matter, merchants should be
allowed to segment their consumer base, draw inferences from historical data,
and customize their offerings. But society should be more concerned when
merchants become empowered to a degree where they can tailor offerings in realtime, have constantly evolving customer profiles in conjunction with updatable
data sets that enable responsive actions, and manipulate consumers in interactive
manners. It would be both impossible and undesirable for policy makers to
anticipate all potential advancements in algorithms in the merchant-consumer
context, but in many ways, the trade off between facilitating commerce and
protecting consumers may be necessary for evaluation and response.
B. Algorithmic Interactionswith Consumers
Algorithms present beneficial opportunities to merchants by providing
inferences from data in digital interactions with consumers. Merchants benefit
from being able to target consumers more effectively, in real-time, and with high

5
See generally Ragnar Fjelland, Why General Artificial Intelligence Will Not Be Realized,
HUMANS. & Soc. Scis. COMMC'N, June 17, 2020; David Miller, A Philosophical Critique of
Artificial Intelligence (Spring 1990) (Honors College Capstone Experience/Thesis Project,
Western Kentucky University) (on file with Western Kentucky University Honors College);
Latanya Sweeney, That's Al?: A History and Critique of the Field (2003),
https://dataprivacylab.org/projects/thatsai/paper.pdf.
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predictive accuracy. 55 Conversly, consumers may lack digital literacy or be
56
unable to make informed decisions when merchants utilize algorithms.
First, in terms of targeting consumers, algorithms enable merchants to
benefit from assessments of consumers; the more data that there is about the
consumer, the better the merchant can draw inferences about consumer behaviors
and preferences. Merchants can generate greater commercial profit and improve
access to their services through algorithms that generate information and analysis
of consumers' backgrounds and interests.57 Algorithms are increasingly being
used to analyze a wide range of data sources to assess consumers and their digital
58
footprint to predict the actions a consumer may take with high accuracy. While
algorithms may enable consumer' access to merchants' services that may have
previously been unavailable, they disproportionately enhance merchants'
traditional means of assessing consumers. The unwanted behaviors relating to
targeting of consumers that are promoted by algorithms occur when merchants
collect personal consumer data that helps inform a personalized pricing
algorithm that violates a material promise related to the collection and use of that
data. 5
Second, algorithms may present biases in their decision-making and may
be discriminatory in drawing inferences about a consumer, including on issues
of race, religion, gender, and national origin. Although algorithmic decisionmaking can seem rational, neutral, and unbiased, it can lead to unfair or illegal
discrimination. 60 Algorithms have the potential to create inaccuracies and biases
that could lead to detrimental effects for low-income and underserved
popluations. 6 1 The unwanted behaviors relating to biases that are promoted by

See generally Fayyaz et al., supra note 30, at 1.
Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Need Grows for Algorithmic Literacy, Transparency,
2017)
8,
(Feb.
CTR.
RscH.
PEW
Oversight,
and
https://www.pewresearch.org/intemet/2017/02/08/theme-7-the-need-grows-for-algorithmicliteracy-transparency-and-oversight/.

55

56

See generally Anindita A. Khade, Performing CustomerBehaviorAnalysis Using Big Data
5
Analytics, International Conference on Communication, Computing, and Virtualization, 79
PROCEDIA COMPUT.

SCi.

986,

987 (2016).

See generally Abhijit Raorane & R.V. Kulkarni, Data Mining Techniques: A Source for
Consumer Behavior Analysis '(2011), https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1 109/1109.1202.pdf
Directoratefor Financialand Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Personalised
59
Pricingin the DigitalEra-Noteby the United States, supra note 23.
60
Federik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Strengthening Legal Protection Against Discrimination

58

by Algorithms andArtificial Intelligence, 24 J. HUMAN RTs. 1573, 1573 (2020).
61
See FTC, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?

(2016),

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-

understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf.
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algorithms occur when presonalized pricing is based on factors that violate
certain U.S. antidiscrimination laws. 62
Problematic algorithmic outcomes stem from faulty inputs, faulty
conclusions, failures with testing, and proxy discrimination. 63 Algorithmic
discrimination may be embedded in or can be magnified by data processing, and
would be prohibited by discrimination laws if such decisions were carried out by
human processes alone. 64 Merchants can utilize algorithms to customize and
tailor their products and services to consumers' preferences and, in so doing,
present new concerns for transparency and accountability, privacy and security,
and non-discrimination and data fairness for law and society. 65 The challenges
arising from the treatment of algorithmic decision-making in business suggest
that new normative considerations and regulatory frameworks are warranted.
This Section provides the key concepts in play for two major areas where
consumers may encounter algorithmic decision-making by merchants-(1)
pricing and (2) profiling. It describes how algorithmic decision-making raises
implications in consumer protection law for consumers, innovators, legislators,
merchants, policy makers, and regulators.
1.

Pricing

Algorithms can process consumer data for personalized advertising via
pricing decisions. Algorithmic pricing can take many forms and can give rise to

Directoratefor Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Personalised
Pricing in the DigitalEra-Note by the United States, supra note 23.
62

63

Remarks of Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Algorithms and Economic Justice,

Federal Trade Commission (Jan. 24, 2020) at 3, 6, 8 (stating that faculty inputs refers to "garbage
in, garbage out" or skewed data that reflects problematic human biases or a dataset that is not
adequately representative; describing faculty conclusions as "data in, garbage out" or the use of
data to generate conclusions that are inaccurate or misleading; suggesting that failure to test refers
to algorithms being deployed without adequate testing that could uncover unanticipated outcomes
before they harm people in the real world; describing proxy discrimination as "the predictive power
of a facially neutral characteristic [that] is at least partially attributable to its correlation with a
suspect classifier").
6
Thomas B. Nachbar, Algorithmic Fairness, Algorithmic Discrimination,FLA. ST. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2020); Nicholas Schmidt & Bryce Stephens, An Introduction to Artificial
Intelligence and Solutions to the Problems of Algorithmic Discrimination (Nov. 8, 2019),
arXiv.org https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.05755.
65
See generally Bo Cowgill & Catherine Tucker, Algorithmic Fairnessand Economics (Apr.

2019)

(Colum.

Bus.

Sch.

https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3361280;

Adriano Koshiyama, Automation and Fairness (Sept.
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract-id=3698404.
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prices that vary automatically according to the cost of the product or service, to
66
supply and demand, and to consumers' preferences.
Merchants can utilize algorithms to infer information about the
consumer and help decide whether or not to send the consumer a certain price in
an ad or a certain promotion. 67 In some cases, merchants' involvement may be
minimal, and algorithms may be self-executing once deployed, such that the
consumer may be interacting with the algorithm.
In the pricing context, algorithms can provide predictive analytics on the
likelihood of purchase decisions by consumers. Merchants may use algorithms
for predictive analytics to assert the likelihood of future outcomes based on
analysis of historical data. 68 Merchants can utilize algorithms to collect and
analyze data on consumers, such as their purchase history, social media activity,
locations visited, Internet browsing history, amount of time spent on a website,
speed of movement of a mouse pointer on a website, and time spent hovering
their mouse over different parts of a website. Algorithms are utilized by
merchants to predict consumer behavior and preferences, to forecast demand and
69
price changes, and to target consumers more effectively. Such algorithms can
be classified as personalized pricing algorithms, dynamic pricing algorithms, and
ranking and recommendation algorithms; they share in common a predictiondriven mathematical means by which merchants respond to consumer
characteristics.
Personalized pricing algorithms analyze consumer preferences to
determine a price for a particular good or service that is tailored to a consumer.
Merchants may consider that such algorithms efficiently determine pricing that
matches what a consumer most values. Some have argued that personalized
pricing by itself does not raise consumer protection issues, but instead is
redistributive and increases both total and consumer welfare. 70 This perspective
considers personalized pricing as a specie of permissible price discrimiation, for
which the merchant prices consumers individually (i.e, different kind of prices

66

Pierre Honor6 & Guillaume Fabre, European Union-Algorithmic Pricing Under Article

15,
2019),
LEXOLOGY
(Oct.
101
TFEU,
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6f23d01 a-150d-400a-b594-6d5542054025.
67
See generally When Algorithms Set Prices: Winners and Losers, OXERA (June 19, 2017),
https://www.oxera.com/insights/reports/when-algorithms-set-prices-winners-and-losers/.
See generally How Machine Learning Is Reshaping Price Optimization, TRYO LABS (Apr.
68
16, 2020), https://tryolabs.com/blog/price-optimization-machine-learning/.
69
Zach Y. Brown & Alexander MacKay, Competition in PricingAlgorithms (Harv. Bus. Sch.,

Working Paper No. 20-067, 2021).
Directoratefor Financialand Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Personalised
70
Pricingin the DigitalEra-Note by the United States, supra note 23 (arguing that "personali[z]ed
pricing may intensify competition by allowing firms to target prices to poach rivals' customers"
and "[act in a] redistributive [manner by allowing] some consumers [to] benefit, because they have
access to products at lower prices than they otherwise would; while some consumers may lose,
because they could pay higher prices than they would if the firm were to charge a single price").
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for the same kind of product with the same production costs), for as much as the
consumer is willing to pay according to the information that the merchant has on
each consumer. While some economists consider that such price discrimination
allows merchants to extract more consumer surplus (i.e., the difference between
how much each consumer is willing to pay and what one ends up paying) and
increase overall social welfare (by serving more consumers than a similarly
imperfect market without price discrimination), such views do not consider the
status and impact to consumers in the marketplace.
The advent of algorithmic-driven decisions in merchant-consumer
interactions has significantly reduced merchants' costs of collecting and
analyzing information on each consumer. Moreover, consumers are dilvuging
information explicitly and in ways that are implicit in their habits and behaviors.
The problems with algorithmic-driven decisions in merchant-consumer
interactions are with transparency and fairness. Foremost, it is reasonable for
consumers to want greater transparency of merchants and to know whether and
how merchants' algorithms utilze information about them. Additionally,
merchants' use of algorithms may be unfair to consumers, who would want to
have the ability to shop around and negotiate prices. The problems multiply when
algorithms become too influential with suggesting the path for the consumer to
take, providing the consumer with the illusion of choice, and promoting use
scarcity.7 1 The ability of algorithms used by merchants to change consumers'
beliefs and behaviors in an exploitative manner should weaken the perspective
that personalized pricing is an acceptable form of price discrimination that
reflects the price that the market will bear. 72
Consumers may consider such a practice as being unfair price
discrimination when they lose their already limited market power. Algorithms
that go too far undermine the status of consumers as participants in the market,
and in so doing, strip consumers' ability to benefit from the market. Algorithms
can exacerbate existing merchant-consumer information asymmetries 73 in a way
that undermines the goals of markets in serving consumers. Merchants can
undermine the ability of consumers to substantially benefit from their market
participation through exploitative mechanisms. For example, a merchant may
use an algorithm that would optimize pricing by determining the likelihood that
a consumer would purchase a product based on a discount or a premium in an

Daniel Faggella, AIfor SocialInfluence andBehavior Manipulationwith Dr. CharlesIsbell,
EMERJ (Feb. 9, 2019), https://emerj.com/ai-podcast-interviews/ai-social-influence-behaviormanipulation-dr-charles-isbell/.
71

72
Liesl Yearsly, We Need To Talk About the Power of AI To ManipulateHumans, MIT TECH.
REv. (June 5, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/06/05/105817/we-need-to-talkabout-the-power-of-ai-to-manipulate-humans/.

73
The concept of information asymmetry between merchants and consumers is discussed in
more detail below. See infra, Section III.A.1.
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discriminatory way. 74 Additionally, merchants can utilize algorithms on a
widespread scale to show different customers a different number or results of
prices in what may be deemed an unethical way. Some of these practices may be
considered unfair price discrimination, which involves the sale of two or more
similar goods at prices that are at different ratios to marginal cost and which
necessitates considerations of different laws and regulations across various
jurisdictions. 75
Dynamic pricing algorithms could automatically adjust a merchant's
pricing. Such dynamic price adjustments could occur in response to other
competitor merchants' pricing or to changes in the marketplace. Dynamic pricing
algorithms are utilized in conjunction with data scraping technology that
searches, extracts, and compares prices across platforms. 76 In so doing,
algorithms can quickly find a competitor merchant's prices using bots to extract
pricing and product information and, then, instantly provide a price match to its
target consumers.7 7 One particular type of dynamic pricing algorithm is a
unilateral pricing algorithm that automatically provides a lower price as a
discount to a competitor's price or a higher price as a premium to a competitor's
price. 78 Another particular type of dynamic pricing algorithm entails risk
assessment features, wherein the algorithm analyzes a buyer's personal data and
circumstances to assess the likelihood that an individual will act in a certain way
based on its risk profile and preferences. 79 Merchants can use dynamic pricing
algorithms to modulate their price offerings to consumers based on changes in
the marketplace, an understanding of consumer risk preferences, and a desire to
communicate a certain perception of their product or service to consumers. While
such algorithms may make it easier for consumers to compare prices among

Marshall Fisher, Santiago Gallino & Jun Li, Competition-BasedDynamic Pricingin Online
74
Retailing: A Methodology Validatedwith FieldExperiments, 64 MGMT. SCI. 2496, 2512 (2017).
75

George Stilger, The Theory of Price (4th ed., Plagrave Macmillan 1987); Lars A. Stole,

Price Discrimination and Competition, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2221
(Elsevier ed. 2007); Hal Varian, Price Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 597 (Richard Schmalense & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); Oren Bar-Gill,
Algorithmic Price Discrimination When Demand Is a Function of Both Preferences and
(Mis)perceptions, 86 U. Chi. L. Rev. 217 (2021).
76
Marian Zeis, Empirical Analysis of Dynamic Pricing on the "Amazon.de" Marketplace,
(Mar. 2018) (Bachelor's Thesis, Berlin School of Economics and Law).

77

Le Chen, Alan Mislove & Christo Wilson, An EmpiricalAnalysis ofAlgorithmic Pricingon

Amazon

Marketplace, in 25TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD WIDE WEB

1339

(2016).

Sheng Li & Claire Chunying Xie, Automated Pricing Algorithms and Collusion: A Brave
78
New World or Old Wine in New Bottles?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2018, at 3.
Pricing Algorithms: Economic Working Paper on the Use of Algorithms To Facilitate
79
Collusion and Personalised Pricing, COMPETITION & MKTs. AUTH. (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/746353/Algorithms_econ report.pdf.
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merchants and reduce consumer search cost, such automatic price adjustments
may present a form of price discrimination.
Ranking and recommendation algorithms can gauge a consumer's
preference for a good or service and, in response, present a recommendation.
Such ranking and recommendation algorithms are utilized by merchants in
gathering information on purchasing patterns and customer reviews. 80 Merchants
can also utilize algorithms to bolster reviews through paid reviews that make
their products appear more appealing to consumers. Competitor merchants could
implement algorithms to generate fake reviews to distort another merchant's
product or service appeal to the same consumer base. One particular type of a
ranking and recommendations algorithm is a matching algorithm, and it matches
merchants and consumers based on a consumer's preference and criterion
specified by the consumer.
In sum, algorithms present powerful new analytical capabilities in
developing pricing, ranking, and recommendation responses. Many of these
pricing-related capabilities escape legal detection due to the algorithms' opacity
and merchants' subtle and effective ways to blur price discrimination and price

optimization."
2. Profiling
Algorithms can analyze consumer data to identify the links between
individuals and construct profiles of groups of consumers. Profiling refers to the
automated processing of personal data to evaluate, analyze, or predict a
consumer's personal preferences or behaviors.82 It allows merchants to group
consumers together according to characteristics, such as age, gender, lifestyle
choices, income, location, past purchases, and search terms. As a result,
merchants can practice extensive targeted advertising to consumers.
Profiling is defined as the "systematic and purposeful recording and
classification of data related to individuals" and "involves individualized
targeting, real-time experimentation, and platformization." 8 3 Algorithmic
methods enable profiling, which provides statistical inferences about consumers

80
See Amirreza Rohani & Mohsen Nazari, Impact of Dynamic Pricing Strategies on
Consumer Behavior, 4 J. MGMT. RsCH. 143, 147 (2012).
81
Sonia K. Katyal, PrivateAccountability in an Age of Al, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF ALGORITHMS 74 (Woodrow Barfield ed., 2020).
82
Diana Sancho, Chilling Automated Decision-Making Under Article 22 GDPR: Towards a
More Substantial Regime for Solely Automated Decision-Making, in ALGORITHMS AND LAW 138

(Martin Ebers & Susana Navas eds., 2020).

83
Moritz Buchi, Edward Fosch Villaronga, Christoph Lutz, Aurelia Tamb-Larrieux et. al,
Chilling Effects of Profiling Activities: Mapping the Issues 3 (2019) (manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract-3379275.
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84
when specific personal characteristics are difficult to get or observe. Profiling
refers to algorithmic techniques that automatically process data related to
consumers, develop inferences about the consumer's characteristics and
preferences, and develop predictions for the purpose of constructing profiles for
future decision-making. 85 The analytical and predictive capabilities of algorithms
in making inferences that distinguish among consumers is at a greater scale and
with faster speed than prior methods employed by marketeers.
Merchants and marketers have utilized segmentation techniques to
identify and characterize groups of consumer needs or preferences. The
challenge with algorithms in business is for merchants to personalize without
contravening the law on profiling. 86 Market segmentation, customer
demographic profiles, and statistical approaches are common exercises
employed by merchants and marketeers, who aim to analyze and predict
behaviors of consumers. 87 Profiling practices enable merchants to develop
loyalty programs, customer relationship management tools, and personalized
advertising programs.
But when profiling is utilized by merchants for far-reaching monitoring,
social sorting, and unfair effects, they can raise legal and ethical issues. When
consumers, based on the profiles, get assigned to market segments such that the
resulting treatment is different for a particular consumer relative to others or
when there are exclusionary actions based on certain characteristics, then such
profiling is problematic from a discriminatory standpoint. Discrimination occurs
when the data input on the consumer is not relevant enough to reach a correct
conclusion. 88 In such cases, the algorithms embody society's biases; designers of
algorithms are not demographically diverse, the data inputs do not reflect
89
diversity, and algorithms mirror a narrow and privileged vision of society.

Betsy Anne Williams, Catherine F. Brooks & Yotam Shmargad, How Algorithms
4
Discriminate Based on Data They Lack: Challenges, Solutions, and Policy Implications, J. INFO.
& TECH. 78, 80 (2018).
85
Buchi et al., supra note 83, at 2, 5.
86
Buchi et al., supra note 83, at 2, 5.
vacy Law?, JDSPRA (May
marketing-and-services-16479/.

8,

ARTHUR MEIDAN, CUSTOMER
87
FINANCIAL SERVICES 23-49 (1996).

2020),

https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/personalising-

BEHAVIOR AND MARKET

SEGMENTATION,

MARKETING

88

Peter Seele, Claus Dierksmeier, Reto Hofstetter & Mario D. Schultz, Mapping the Ethicality
of Algorithmic Pricing:A Review of Dynamic and Personalized Pricing,J. Bus. ETHICS (2019);

Anja Lambrecht & Catherine Tucker, Algorithmic Bias?: A Study of Data-Based Discrimination
12,
2016),
Media
(Sept.
in
Social
Serving
of
Ads
in
the
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/publicevents/966823/lambrechttucker algorithmic
biasfinal.pdf.
89
Ari Ezra Waldman, Algorithmic Legitimacy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
ALGORITHMS 107,114-15 (Woodrow Barfield ed., 2020).
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Discrimination is encountered when algorithms apply profiling methods
that categorize consumers in a way that treats certain groups (such as those based
on race, religion, gender, and national origin) differently or denies access of
products and services to certain groups. For example, if some consumers receive
certain prices or special offers due to their association or inclusion in a certain
group while other consumers are not provided such a benefit, this could be
discrimination. Additionally, for instance, if algorithms categorize some
consumers as wealthy to receive certain medical or cosmetic products while
excluding others that may be considered higher risk due to their gender or race,
that would be considered discrimination. In sum, it could be difficult to
determine whether consumers have been discriminated against, difficult to tell
whether there was intentional or inadvertent discrimination by merchants,
difficult to identify discrimination in data and output of data, and difficult to
define what constitutes discrimination in the algorithmic context between
merchants and consumers. The consequences are severe when such algorithmic
decisions deprive a consumer of the same benefit provided to other consumers.
III. THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES

Algorithms are proliferating in the merchant-consumer interaction and
are shaping business and society. As merchant's' use of algorithms increasingly
monitors and controls consumer behaviors, algorithms have far-reaching
significance for output, outcome, and impact on the merchant-consumer
interaction. The increasing significance of algorithms in business makes
theoretical inquiries necessary to inform policy debate and potential regulatory
responses. Measures of regulation of algorithms in business should be tailored to
achieve socially desirable goals and avoid undesired effects based on theoretical
considerations raised by algorithms' technological characteristics.
A.

TheoreticalPrinciples

Under conditions of growing use cases of algorithms in business, more
and more consumers are engaging with algorithms in interactions with
merchants. The changing distribution of algorithms usage between merchants
and consumers poses a threat to consumer rights, effective consumer choice, and
fair business practices. As merchants begin to use algorithms at a greater pace,
far outstripping consumers' awareness or understanding of them, the exercise of
consumer choice is weakened. Algorithm development and proliferation by
merchants challenges the dominant approach of consumer sovereignty, or
satisfying consumers without coercion, deception, or other influences from
merchants. 90 The theoretical rationale for consumer protection in an algorithmic

90
Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory ofAntitrust
and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 715-17 (1997).
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era is that consumers become an even weaker party as merchants increasingly
begin to exploit significant information disparities. 91 On the basis of these
considerations, (1) information asymmetry and power imbalances and (2) biases
and discrimination result through algorithm usage by merchants and necessitate
regulatory responses.
1.

Information Asymmetry & Power Imbalances

One major theoretical consideration for effective consumer sovereignty
is the imbalance caused by algorithms in the bargain between merchants and
consumers. The private and negotiated bargain between merchants and
consumers becomes one-sided when merchants have greater knowledge and
understanding through data utilized in algorithms. Thus consumers face higher
transaction costs in order to garner the equivalent level of comprehension about
the bargain as the merchant regarding the offered product or service. In the
absence of the intervention of laws and regulations, algorithms create a perceived
asymmetry between merchants and consumers, such that there are severe
differences in bargaining power resulting in consumer' fairness and efficiency
concerns. 92 Consumers lack comprehension of the algorithms' capacities, and
merchants collect much more information than the consumer can know or
reasonably oversee, and as result, consumers become vulnerable to merchants'
use of algorithms. 93
Consumers would face significant efforts and transaction costs in order
to achieve the capability level of merchants that utilize algorithms. In order for
consumers to understand the purpose for which merchants' algorithms would
collect, utilize, and analyze data about themselves, algorithms would need to be
fair, accountable, and transparent to consumers. 94 At a minimum, consumers
would need clear explanations and a description of the consequences merchants'
algorithmic-driven decisions have on them. While notice and choice about
algorithmic uses of consumer data gives consumers some choice, that may not
be enough. Even if a consumer is notified about the use of an algorithm by a
merchant that offers a product or service, the consumer's choice alone could still
be amidst algorithms that are not considered fair, accountable, or transparent.

91

Giesela Ruhl, Consumer Protection in Choice of Law, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569, 571-72

(2011).
92

See generally Danaher et al., supra note 12, at 2 (suggesting that algorithms "nudge, bias,
guide, provoke, control, manipulate and constrain human behavior" and, in so doing, would treat
consumers in an unfair manner and raise inaccuracies in predictions).

93

See generally Peter J. van der Waerdt, Information Asymmetries: Recognizing the Limits of

the GDPR on the Data-DrivenMarket, 2020 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REv. 38 (2020).
94

Robyn Caplan, Joan Donovan, Lauren

Hanson

& Jeanna

Matthews, Algorithmic

Accountability: A Primer, DATA & Soc'Y, Apr. 18, 2018, at 4; Bruno Lepri, Nuria Oliver,
Emmanuel F Latouze, Alex Paul Pentland et al., Fair, Transparent, andAccountable Algorithmic
Decision-MakingProcesses, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 611, 611-27 (2018).
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Merchants face inherent difficulty in explaining algorithms and their operation
to consumers, and expecting consumers to bear the burden accentuates the
problem. As a result of the information asymmetry between merchants and
consumers due to algorithms, there is a need for regulatory intervention to
regulate information as a means to offset the information imbalance between the
parties. 95
2.

Biases & Discrimination

Another major theoretical consideration for effective consumer
sovereignty is the potential for algorithms to discriminate while analyzing,
drawing correlations, and making predictions based on billions of data points.
Algorithmic discrimination could arise through a number of mechanisms in
theory. Such forms of discrimination through the use of algorithms exist in both
commercial and non-commercial contexts, but there are also consumer-specific
forms of algorithmic discrimination as well. In theory, discrimination by
algorithms in any context could arise based on technological characteristics of
the algorithms, such as training on input data based on historical examples,
feature selection, insufficient or distorted training data, randomness in the data,
or hidden black-box techniques. 96 In addition, algorithmic discrimination in the
merchant-consumer context could arise based on intentional reasons or
unintentional business or economic reasons that impact certain groups.
In addition to consumers' concerns with information asymmetry and
power balances caused by merchants' use of algorithms, consumers should be
concerned about intentional discrimination and about inferences drawn from
algorithms' processing of their data. Merchants can draw such inferences about
consumers and, in so doing, can predict future behavior of consumers by
analyzing how individuals viewed and evaluated their purchases. 97 Inferences
include that of gender, race, and sexual orientation or, in general, categorization
for the purpose of distinguishing groups of consumers. Problems with such
inferences for consumers include inaccuracies and difficulties in their
verification. Even more problematic are when such inferences introduce biases
or cause merchants to discriminate in new and unique ways that are specific to
algorithms.

95

Ruhl, supra note 91, at 578-79.

Carlos Zednik, Solving the Black Box Problem: A Normative Frameworkfor Explainable
Artificial Intelligence(2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.04361.pdf.
96

97
See Monique Mann & Tobia Matzner, ChallengingAlgorithmic Profiling: The Limits of
Data Protection and Anti-Discrimination in Responding to Emergent Discrimination,BIG DATA
& Soc'Y, July-Dec. 2019, at 1; see generally Frank R. Kardes, Steven S. Posavac & Maria L.
Cronley, Consumer Inference: A Review of Processes, Bases, and Judgment Context, 14 J.
CONSUMER PSYCH. 230,230-56 (2004).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol123/iss3/7

24

Ebrahim: Algorithms in Business, Merchant-Consumer Interactions, & Regulat
ALGORITHMS IN BUSINESS

2021 ]

897

Merchants may draw inferences using algorithms in ways there were not
fathomable by anti-discrimination laws. In so doing, algorithms can discriminate
in ways that society may consider intentional if shown to be purposeful by the
merchant or unintentional if enabled by the algorithm in unexpected yet apparent
ways. Thus, a merchant with a malicious intention may purposefully create a
discriminatory outcome by knowingly starting with a biased dataset, or a
merchant may infer attributes that separate a particular segment from the general
population and amplify that bias. 98 In either scenario, existing social and political
biases may get systemized in the algorithms through technological
99
considerations with input data, training data, and programming of data.
Algorithms may also suggest some variables that are generally relevant for
analysis and decisions to serve as proxies for class membership in ways that can
create discriminatory impacts against vulnerable classes or develop associations
00
between one characteristic and a specific class of people.1 For example, Internet
search engines and online paid advertising utilize algorithms that reinforce
discrimination in society.1 01 As another example, algorithms can profile
segments of the population in a way that punishes the poor and working class
and serves higher paying consumer segments.1 0 2 In particular, algorithms have
been considered to amplify racial hierarchies and to tailor to consumers by
race.' 03
Consumers lack practical means of reinforcing laws that prohibit
discrimination in an era of algorithms. In an era of algorithms, however, even
when merchants do not intentionally discriminate, there may be discrimination
through the nature of attribution of inferences. For example, names of consumers
may result in inferences on purchase history from which merchants can make
marketing, pricing, and promotion decisions of goods and services. Algorithms
may draw upon demographic and statistical data that relates to a wider group of
consumers to draw upon attributes of specific individuals, such as those of a
certain gender, race, or sexual orientation.' 0 4 As a result of expansive use of
algorithms, the distinction between data that may be sensitive to discrimination
and non-sensitive data is becoming blurred since more and more proliferating
algorithms are being used for whatever data is encountered in business. In effect,
merchants' use of algorithms could conceal discrimination in business and

Robin Nunn, Discriminationin the Age ofAlgorithms, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON
98
THE LAW OF ALGORITHMS 182, 193-94 (Woodrow Barfield ed., 2020).
Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Learning Algorithms and Discrimination, in
99
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 96 (Woodrow Barfield &

Ugo

Pagallo eds., 2018).
100

Nunn, supra note 98, at 195; Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 99, at 96.

101

See generally SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION (N.Y. Univ. Press 2018).

102

See generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY (Macmillan Publishing 2019).
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104

Williams et al., supra note 84.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2021

(Polity

Press 2019).

25

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 123, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

898

[Vol. 123

potentially could systematize discrimination if there is not a response by law and
regulation.
B. Regulation Considerations
The more economic and social power that algorithms are given or have
for merchants to utilize, the more it will become common for consumers to
experience unequal treatment and unfair treatment in the merchant-consumer
relationship. In an algorithmic-driven commercial world, the algorithms and the
data used with them can be used for multiple purposes that are far beyond the
obvious uses of simply offering products to consumers.' 0 5 Algorithms can exploit
vulnerabilities of consumers and deliberately manipulate messages and offerings
to consumers. 106 Consumers lack the understanding or the means to appreciate
the complexities of algorithms, which may not be designed with the values of the
legal system. 107 The result is that algorithms can have undesired effects from an
ethical, social, or economic perspective on the merchant-consumer interaction,
which in turn impacts the relevant norms. Consequently, law may need to be
tailored to address this particular interaction through a mode of governance to
avoid undesired effects. 108
Algorithms are a type of transformative digital technology that requires
a new legal and regulatory framework since they may distort the purpose of the
intended merchant-consumer interaction in society. As a transformative
technology, algorithms have the essential qualities that drive legal and policy
conversations that attend them since they change the intended interaction and
undermine balance. 109 Up until now, algorithms have been developed and
utilized in the merchant-consumer context with relatively little oversight, and
consumer protection law has been developed without considering them. Thus, a
major consideration is whether and how to regulate the emergence of algorithms
in the merchant-consumer interaction. Regulatory choices in general could
include self-structuring and self-regulation, self-imposed rules, public authority
regulation, and ethical standards. 1 0 In particular, time-based regulatory
considerations of algorithms include preventive regulatory instruments, public
authorities' action that serves as a parallel to the use of software applications, ex

105
Mario Martini, Regulating Algorithms: How To Demystify the Alchemy of Code?, in
ALGORITHMS AND LAW 101, 103 (Martin Ebers & Susana Navas eds., 2020).
106 See Martin Ebers, Regulating AI and Robotics, in ALGORITHMS AND LAw 7-73 (Martin
Ebers & Susana Navas eds., 2020).
107
Martini, supra note 40, at 108.

108
Wolfgang Hoffman-Riem, A rtificialIntelligence as a Challengefor Law andRegulation, in
REGULATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 5-6 (Thomas Wischmeyer & Timo Rademacher eds.,
2020).
109
10

Weaver, supra note 42, at 158.
Riem, supra note 108, at 18-24.
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post protections that shape damages, and self-regulation with an algorithmic
responsibility code."' This Article argues in part for an algorithmic
responsibility code that brings together a private panel of experts in business and,
in so doing, infuses a modern business perspective into the merchant-consumer
interaction and effectively lets the market decide governance of algorithms in
merchant-consumer interactions.
IV. STATE OF LEGISLATION & REGULATION AND A PROPOSAL WITH FUTURE
DIRECTIONS

The treatment of data that is available on consumers, and in particular
the process of profiling them and drawing inferences about them, is central to the
merchant-consumer
interaction.
Consequently,
achieving
fairness,
accountability, and transparency in the merchant-consumer interaction must take
into account how algorithms utilize consumer data that is being collected, used,
and shared with others.
2
Legal regimes are unprepared to address algorithmic decisions.' As a
result, various legislative proposals in different nations and among U.S. states
have arisen with provisions to protect consumers from adverse effects of
algorithmic decision-making. Differences in jurisdictions' approaches include
protecting consumers against information asymmetry, power imbalances, and
discrimination and striving to achieve transparency and accountability, privacy,
and non-discrimination. The consideration of these principles aims to reduce
algorithmic unfairness and to achieve data fairness." 3 A balance must be struck
for reform that addresses tradeoffs between consumer protection and
encouraging innovation in business activity. Algorithms themselves do not know
when they have crossed the line into unfair treatment or discrimination of
consumers. Legislation and regulation provide a means to balance the merchantconsumer relationship and the risks that come from algorithm-driven business.

"

Martini, supra note 40, at 111-32.
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112
Law? Algorithmic Consumer Credit Scoring in the EU and US, CASE W. RSRV. J.L., TECH.,
INTERNET (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 53), https://ssm.com/abstract-3671488.
113
See generally Cowgill & Tucker, supra note 65; Emre Kazim, Jeremy Barnett & Adriano
Koshiyama, Automation and Fairness(Dep't of Computer Sci., Univ. College London, Working
Paper, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3698404; Mark MacCarthy,
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State of Legislation & Regulation

Consumers in both the United States and the European Union are in a
similarly vulnerable position since they are not equipped to tackle decisions
made by algorithms. 1 4 There are numerous uses of algorithms by merchants that
present potential implications for consumers, and the United States and the
European Union have different approaches and a different protections for
consumers. The reason for the differences in the United States and European
Union enforcement actions stems from the vastly different ideologies behind
American and European data protection laws. 15
The United States has no fully federal law similar to that of the European
Union that protects consumers from organizations that target or collect data
related to people. 16 In sum, the United States and European Union's approaches
to algorithms in the merchant-consumer context differ in stage of development
and in cultural and historical backgrounds. Algorithmic decision-making poses
challenges to the notice and choice aspects of data protection law and regulation,
which differ between the United States and European Union.' 1 7 This Section
compares the statutes of the United States and the European Union in the context
of algorithms, data, and consumer protection.
1.

United States Legislation

The FTC is a federal agency with law enforcement authority that protects
consumers against unfairness and deception in commercial practices. 18 While
the FTC is charged with protecting consumers from digital exploitation in the
commercial context, its ability to police and prevent abusive practices is limited
by its narrow statutory authority, minimal available resources, and lack of
rulemaking authority. 11 9 The FTC's limited power to enforce data privacy
policies stems from the lack of omnibus privacy and data security legislation in

114

Gikay, supra note 112, at 1.
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Kimberly A. Houser & W. Gregory Voss, GDPR: The End of Google and Facebook or a

New Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (2018).
116
Megan Marie Miller, Data as the New Oil: A Slippery Slope of Trade Secret Implications
Greasedby the CaliforniaConsumer Privacy Act, 12 CYBARIS, 1, 6 (2021).
117
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AND
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21-22
(2020),
https://www.itu.int/en/ITUT/extcoop/figisymposium/Documents/FIGI_SIT_Techinical%20reportBig%20data%2C%20Ma
chine%201earning%2C%20Consumer%20protection%20and%20Privacyf.pdf.
118
About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Apr.
24,
2021) (stating that the mission of the FTC is "[p]rotecting consumers and competition by
PROTECTION

preventing anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices through law enforcement,
advocacy, and education without unduly burdening legitimate business activity").
119
Barrett, supra note 13, at 1074.
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the United States; as a result, the FTC is limited in' being able to take action
20
The
against merchants that engage in unfair and deceptive trade practices.
limits of the FTC's ability to protect consumers from exploitation necessitates
new legislation to prevent abuses, manipulation against consumers, and expand
the scope of its enforcement against informational harms.
Comprehensive legislation in response to algorithmic decision-making
2
by merchants has been challenging to forge in the United States.1 ' Algorithms
and data collection by private entities are governed by a patchwork of state and
federal law. 22 The U.S. federal government has only recently begun to consider
legislation concerning algorithms, and states have hardly considered issues
23
There have been
pertaining to algorithms in their statutes and regulations.'
with
accountability
greater
to
provide
attempts
and
legislative
several bills
but
information,
private
consumers'
of
algorithmic decision-making and sharing
such efforts have not yielded regulatory solutions.
The Setting an American Framework to Ensure Data Access,
Transparency, and Accountability ("SAFE DATA") Act sought to provide
American consumers with more control of their data and directs merchants to be
more transparent and accountable with the use and processing of consumers'
data. 24 The SAFE DATA Act includes the Filter Bubble Transparency Act,
which aimed to make it easier for consumers to understand potential
manipulation from algorithms, 2 2 and the Deceptive Experiences To Online User
Reduction ("DETOUR") Act, which was seeking to protect consumers against
deceptive practices under digital interfaces that trick consumers into giving up
their personal data (known as dark patterns).1 2 6 In relation to algorithms, the

120

Houser & Voss, supra note 115, at 6, 18.

121

Muge Fazlioglu, ConsolidatingUS PrivacyLegislation: The SAFE DATA Act, INT'L Ass'N
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122
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Filter Bubble Transparency Act, S.2763, 116th Cong. (2019).
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Cong. (2019); Press Release, Debra S. Fischer, Sen., U.S. Senate, Senators Introduce Bipartisan
9,
2019),
'Dark
Patterns'
(Apr.
Legislation
To
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Filter Bubble Transparency Act had generated differing perspectives on the
impact of algorithms on consumers. One perspective proposed that the Filter
Bubble Transparency Act could empower consumers with the option to view a
platform's opaque algorithm-generated content and make algorithms more
visible.127 Another perspective, considering the use of algorithms as a blanket
term since all digital search and recommendation systems employ such
algorithms, argued that disclosing some aspects of algorithms would not reveal
micro-targeting or data mining.128 Additionally, the Data Care Act aimed to
protect consumers' personal information that is collected by websites and apps
by requiring an explicit duty to use consumers' data in a responsible way. 12 9
United States legislation has been unsucessful with enacting regluations
that seek to minimize algorithmic extremism in business and protect against
taking advantage of consumers. The U.S. approach seems to consider strong
consumer protection as a barrier to innovation, has been reflected in a narrow
interpretaton of digital harm, and has constrained the authority of the FTC. 44 By
contrast, the European approach to algorithmic decision-making is prioritization
of expections of control of an individual's information and in effect protection
of the rights of consumers.
2.

European Regulation

The normative commitment of European regulation is to meaningful
rights of consumers and meaningful check on merchants. Scholars consider the
European Union's approach to regulation of algorithms superior to that of the
United States's because of its detailed provisions on transparency of automated
decision-making.' 3 1 The European approach stems from a 1995 directive that set
out general rules to transfer into national law each European country's
interpretation and that resulted in the 2016 passage of the GDPR.13 2
other means; or the use of privacy settings that push users to 'agree' as the default option, while
users looking for more privacy-friendly options often must click through a much longer process,
detouring through multiple screens").
127
Chris Mills Rodrigo, Senate Bill Takes Aim at "Secret" Online Algorithms, HTLL (Oct. 31,
2019), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/468385-bipartisan-senators-release-online-platform-

algorithm-transparency-bill (suggesting that the Filter Bubble Transparency Act would help
consumers understand how algorithms work and give consumers the choice to see the world in a
less filtered way).
128
Adi Robertson, The Senate's Secret Algorithms Bill Doesn't Actually Fight Secret
Algorithms, VERGE (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/5/20943634/senate-filter-

bubble-transparency-act-algorithm-personalization-targeting-bill.

129 Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Congress (2018); Data Care Act of 2019, S. 2961
116th Congress (2019).
130
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131
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The GDPR, which is considered a regulatory move in favor of greater
protection for individuals, requires merchants to reveal an algorithm's purpose
3
and the data that is used to make an algorithmic decision.' 3 It seeks to regulate
profiling and discrimination from algorithmic decisions. The GDPR targets the
use of algorithmic decision-making by having humans review certain
algorithmic decisions, and in so doing, it creates an obligation for merchants to
provide either detailed explanations of algorithmic decisions or general
information on how algorithms make decisions." 4
One main goals of the GDPR is to balance the interests of consumers
and their rights against the demands of merchants. The GDPR protects
consumers against automated decision-making and profiling-terms that it
defines. Article 4 defines profiling as
any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of
the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects
relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict
certain aspects concerning that natural person's performance at
work, economic situation, health, personal preferences,
35
interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements.'
Additionally, automated decisions under Article 22 of the GDPR are meant to
36
have "legal effects" on or "similarly significantly affect[]" the recipient.1
While the GDPR provides some safeguards to consumers, a number of
the GDPR's key provisions are ambiguous and undefined and, therefore, present
opportunities to provide guidance to policymakers to offer stronger protection
for consumers. For example, targeted advertising (such as with website banners
automatically adjusting content based on a user's browsing preferences,
personalized recommendations, and updates on available products) is not
ordinarily considered to produce decisions that could "similarly and
significantly" affect consumers, but interpretative guidance suggests that there
are certain circumstances that may increase the likelihood of certain targeted
advertising fitting within Article 22.137 There is some debate over what is
required to be demonstrated, and there is appreciable risk that merchants will
explain their algorithms in unclear ways without a clear definition in the
interpretative guidance. 138
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Regardless of how such circumstances may be interpreted in a particular
dispute under the GDPR, there are more substantive rights for consumers under
it with respect to results from opaque algorithmic decision-making than in the
United States. The GDPR can serve as a model for the use of algorithms in the
merchant-consumer interaction in general and could help to raise the awareness
of consumers and of particularly vulnerable individuals in the United States.
B. A ProposalWith FutureExploration
Algorithms are changing the dynamics of the merchant-consumer
relationship. While the United States has lagged behind the European Union in
legislative measures and regulatory steps, neither has a well-defined protection
of consumers. Achieving the societal goal of finding and implementing a
regulatory approach to maintain consumer sovereignty in an algorithmic era is a
rich line of future exploration and scholarly discourse. There could be a diverse
arsenal of conceivable regulatory measures, which could be applied at various
points in time in the merchant-consumer interaction.
Legislators should not attempt to regulate algorithms in the merchantconsumer context with one regulatory solution. Instead, regulatory efforts should
start by determining the proper scope of protection and appropriate legal
obligations. This may entail sector-specific classifications, certain types of
applicable algorithms, or greater clarity on the necessary legal effect of
algorithmic decision-making utilized by merchants. The breadth of prescription
and the normative implications of these interpretations are expansive, and for
these reasons, a proposal that follows the basic idea of letting the market decide,
but with a unique angle, presents a more suitable legal and policy response.
A self-regulation proposal in the form of a responsibility algorithm code
could serve as a possible new paradigm for a regulatory model. This proposal
would bring together a panel of experts in business to develop a responsible
algorithm code with a set of minimum industry standards or industry guidelines
that would include and balance the opinions from various commercial sectors,
merchants, and consumer associations. There would be a requirement for
compliance with the determined rules of conduct of responsible algorithm code,
or else a required explanation for not following such a code of conduct. The
effects of self-binding and truth claiming would force merchants to make
declarations, or else face market pressures. This proposal would infuse a modern
business perspective into the merchant-consumer interaction and effectively let
the market decide governance of algorithms in merchant-consumer interactions.
This proposal provides one possible responsive measure, but there are
various areas of further exploration and other potential regulatory routes.
Another proposal could consider state specific or local government measures,
which could specify certain types of algorithms, data, and information governed
by federal law. Other proposals could identify the specifics of opt-out provisions.
Moreover, proposals could include provisions concerning obligations to post
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notice about algorithm decision-making, obligations to limit data collection, and
obligations to obtain affirmative consent from consumers.
This Article provides motivation concerning the need for solutions to
protecting consumer data in the context of algorithmic decision-making in
business. Along these lines, this Article's theoretical contributions define a
framework for algorithmic interactions between merchants and consumers via
profiling and pricing. It provides background for policymakers, regulators, legal
scholars, attorneys, merchants, consumers, and consumer associations that are
encountering consumer data and associated laws and regulations. In so doing, it
broadens the perspective of contemporary merchant-consumer interactions and
observes that greater attention should be given to protect consumers from a
power disparity that is aggrandized from the pre-digital world. The Article's goal
was to identify the issues, describe the phenomena, and explain the principles
and factors in legislative measures and regulation to provide stakeholders
oversight of algorithms in business. These issues are still emerging as
algorithmic technologies advance and as use cases and adoption increase in the
merchant-consumer interaction. Policy approaches and potential solutions will
depend on weighing tradeoffs among policy objectives, such as regulation,
business innovation, consumer protection, and economic productivity.
V. CONCLUSION

The use of algorithms to make predictions, recommendations, and
decisions has tremendous benefits to merchants. Algorithms present new
theoretical challenges and regulatory considerations in the merchant-consumer
interaction, such as the potential for unfair pricing and discriminatory profiling
actions. Longstanding laws and principles that protected consumers are facing
challenges in terms of algorithmic methodologies utilized by merchants. As
merchants utilize algorithms to strengthen economic and social power over
consumers, new theoretically-driven concerns about information asymmetry and
bias and discrimination have arisen. The core tenets of consumer protection law
are under tension when the algorithms are utilized to exploit or deliberately
manipulate consumers. Algorithms have undesired ethical, social, and economic
effects for the merchant-consumer interaction if left unaddressed by regulation.
The United States and European Union have taken some steps to provide a
response through legislative activity and initial regulation. Responsible
algorithm code development by a panel of experts provides one possible
responsive measure.
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